In a post pushing for attention to Real Business Cycle models Garret Jones concludes
It’s usually hard to fit RBC into partisan political narratives, which helps explain why we don’t hear about it much. But as long as big ideas come in waves, as long as energy supplies depend on the vagaries of global politics, and as long as politicians enact policies that weaken confidence in the health of a nation’s economic institutions, RBC will matter.
This misunderstands why folks such as myself dismiss discussions of real business cycles (RBC) in the context of macro-economic management.
If your argument was that, in RBC we have a plausible explanation for the co-movement of lots of economic variables and the emergence of booms and busts over time then that’s fine. This may even be a topic of some non-academic interest. Though, aside from the confidence issue, its not immediately clear why.
The key problem, however, is that RBC doesn’t explain the failure of markets to clear and lots of folks report experiences that are damn close what we would expect if markets didn’t clear.
For example, suppose a boom hit and as a result wages and profits rose in the economy. Then later a bust hit and wages and profits fell. Yet, all the while people who wanted a job could get one and relative prices moved up and down but the total buying power of a dollar was stable. In that case I would say that it would be nice to have more booms and we it could be worthwhile to institute policy to help folks during the bust, but by and large, them’s the apples.
Unless we seriously think we can outperform a competitive market equilibrium it would be best not to go monkeying around with things.
Yet, this is not what happens. People look for jobs and can’t find them. Price changes can reverse course almost in unison. Something is going on here.
Even if that something had its origin in a technology shock, what makes it of interest to us is the failure of market clearing. Principally, to beat drum, that people tell us they are looking for jobs but cannot find them.
Moreover, we have evidence that we can help the market to clear by altering monetary policy. So, if a technology driven boom like the late 90s comes along and employers cannot find workers then we can help clear the market by raising interest rates. If the technology shock then fades and it turns out that workers cannot find jobs we can help matters by lowering interest rates.
The point is that regardless of the original source of the co-movement of economic variable what we are interested in is the failure of the economy to adhere to classical intuition. On this key matter not only are RBC models silent, but those brandishing them often dismiss the notion that there is anything to discuss!
This is the real problem with real business cycles.

6 comments
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Tuesday ~ May 8th, 2012 at 11:08 am
Eli
RBC is essential as part of a pluralistic account of macro. The way I think about it is that the AS curve (located in inflation-growth space, not pricelevel-output space) does not hold still. Shocks to technology, oil prices, credit, trust, weather, and numerous other variables cause it to shift left and right. RBC is the theory of dynamic AS movements.
And yes, real shocks can cause displacement. The economy is not frictionless, people cannot find new jobs instantaneously. Plus, if there is a non-clearing labor market, why ignore the ZLB in wages and fixate on the ZLB in interest rates?
By the way, I favor NGDP targeting precisely *because* I think some shocks are real. If there is a negative real shock and the Fed has an inflation target, they will have to *lower* AD. And if the market expects the Fed to lower AD, that can cause AD to go down further (just one example of why you can’t perfectly disentangle AD and AS). With NGDP targeting, inflation goes up to accommodate the negative real shock. Your “evidence” that monetary policy can help the market to clear is not evidence against RBC, it is evidence that sometimes monetary policy sucks.
Tuesday ~ May 8th, 2012 at 11:46 am
Ryan P
You can say there are problems with the RBC model (and certainly RBC to the exclusion of all else, which of course wasn’t Jones’ argument anway), but I don’t think that really explains the reason why you don’t really hear about it in partisan discourse. Imperfections and even fundamental problems with the model and the predictions are very clearly not absolute requisites for getting a lot of press. So, yeah, I think the reason why it’s unlikely your grandmother has heard of RBC is because it’s hard to run a campaign on a promise to take it more seriously.
Tuesday ~ May 8th, 2012 at 1:54 pm
teageegeepea
Garrett Jones explains here (look for the 40:22 section) that the cyclical productivity observation which inspired RBC no longer seems to hold.
Tuesday ~ May 8th, 2012 at 6:22 pm
Morgan Warstler
We have evidence that AUCTIONING excess capacity clears the market.
It has worked for 4K years.
If only we had an online clearing house to AUCTION our excess labor in man weeks…
Well then, we could have a Guaranteed Income plan the conservatives would LOVE.
Karl, why are you trying to molest the macro, before you just simply Auction the Unemployed???
Intellect. Dishonest.
Simply answer right there in your face, and you do pretzel logic to avoid it… sure sign of an ideologue.
Tuesday ~ May 8th, 2012 at 10:09 pm
O
“If the technology shock then fades and it turns out that workers cannot find jobs we can help matters by lowering interest rates.” Are you suggesting that monetary policy helps the labor market clear? Not so much; it may create liquidity for companies if they want to invest and hire workers, but we do know that’s not going so well.
Saturday ~ March 9th, 2013 at 2:09 pm
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