Draghi assures us, not quite yet
Dysfunctional government bond markets in several euro area countries hamper the single monetary policy because the way this policy is transmitted to the real economy depends also on the conditions of the bond markets in the various countries. An impaired transmission mechanism for monetary policy has a damaging impact on the availability and price of credit to firms and households.
This is the very important monetary policy reason for the ECB’s non-standard measures. But of course, such interventions can only be limited. Governments must – individually and collectively – restore their credibility vis-à-vis financial markets.
Tensions in sovereign bond markets have been accompanied by stress in the banking sector given the financial interlinkages between governments and banks. The ECB has taken several measures in 2010 and 2011 to ensure that banks continue to have access to funding sources. This has enabled them to continue lending to firms and households.
See Izabella Kamniska for some of the important details.
Let me give you the briefest of rundowns from a American Fed-centric perspective. Though this is all still hazy in my own mind.
In normal times banks lend overnight money to each other without demanding any collateral. This market is the crux of the financial system. In the US its called the Fed Funds market. In Eurozone, EONIA.
Monetary policy usually revolves around managing this market. However, in stressful times this market can breakdown. This is problem number one.
However, things still workout because a variety of repo markets are still working to provide liquidity. These markets, however, require collateral. This is usually government bonds.
However, when collateral is falling rapidly in value the private repo market can begin to shut down.
Luckily you have the Central Bank repo market, where you can always go and get funds. That is, if you have collateral. So, now you face a situation where individual banks might need to borrow collateral in order to take it to the central bank.
Here in lies the major shut down. If people will not let you borrow collateral, because they distrust that you will give it back, etc, then you may not have anything to take to the central bank. If you don’t have anything to take to the central bank, you can’t get Euros.
As this possibility sets in both the interest rate on borrowing collateral and the amount of cash you have to set aside in case the transaction goes bad goes up. The combination of all of these things is your true Marginal Cost of Funds.
As your marginal cost of funds rises this is effectively monetary tightening. Yet, it is not managed by the central bank it is managed by the repo and securities lending markets.
Now, its bad enough for this to go down and there to be a general credit and collateral crisis. What makes it worse is that in Europe, collateral seems to have a particularly hard time moving across borders because there is a lot of distrust and institutional confusion.
This means you can have a massive collateral shortage in Italy, and a huge marginal cost of funding for some Italian banks. While Germany can be absolutely flush in collateral.
This is also why you can see heavy demand for Italian bond auctions even at an elevated price – people need the collateral but cannot pay more than the market-to-market value for it in the secondary market. But, see a German auction fail at low rates. Because at the current market-to-market rates you are actually losing money holding German bonds as a bank. You might as well sell it and then park your cash in the deposit facility.
Only buy-and-holders really needs Bunds at this point and remember what I said a while back about the marginal bond being sold as collateral for repos.
Now. why was yesterday such a big deal. The lowering of the interest rate was perhaps just for show, although it could encourage more use of Central Bank swap facilities than private swaps.
What really mattered is that the ECB lowered its collateral demand from 20% to 12% thus freeing up more collateral. This could ease the credit-collateral crunch in the Periphery in general and Italy in particular.
More generally the ECB somehow has to ease the collateral crunch so as to bring marginal funding for all areas bank into harmony.
There should be some solution that involves the German government rapidly expanding its outstanding stock of T-Bills. For example, massive tax cuts in Germany funded by short term borrowing. However, that is clearly seems like the type of thing that is off the table.
What seems possible but I have a hard time working is that there might be someway to flood the entire Eurozone with dollars, so Euro funding could be provided by entering in EUR-USD swaps with low collateral requirements.
As always the institutional details are important but it seems to me that the Fed could define a special type of Asset Backed Security that took a specific mixture of European traditional bank liabilities from various countries. Specifically demanding a certain combination of liabilities from Periphery countries.
Then it could open a facility to take that ABS from American banks over a long term like two years or so. This would create demand for Periphery banks to unload their traditional bank liabilities onto American bank for dollars.
Now obviously this pulls an enormous amount of risk on to the Fed. However, its not clear that there is any true risk involved here because the risk associated with a complete shutdown of the Periphery banking system is nearly existential.
More importantly, the negative consequences for US tax payers from such a freeze are extremely high so its not clear that their net exposure has gone up.
This is the odd thing about banking crisis that I need to at some point write more fully about. When you think about risk you have to think about what are the possible worlds that you could end up in.
Well, if the world in which you don’t loan someone money is worse than the world in which you do loan someone money and they don’t pay you back, then there is no risk associated with loaning them money.
The issue is that there is an externality problem because if there is someone else who could loan that person money and avoid the super-bad world, that is obviously preferable. So no one wants to loan up to the optimal amount.
Everyone would prefer any world in which this loan is made, yet everyone would prefer a world in which someone else made it.

9 comments
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Thursday ~ December 1st, 2011 at 11:17 am
Marcelo
Karl,
I still wonder what the chance of the ECB, if it declared its intention to either reflate the economy or push up NGDPs in the EU periphery, would fail to credibly do so. As long as the ECB is willing to buy bonds, or other financial instruments in exchange for cash, it should not really matter whether or not certain types of loans require collateral– because the transmission of monetary policy is through the supply of money and ECB credibility.
I do not believe it is possible that a monetary institution such as the ECB can lose control of monetary policy as you claim here. If the ECB wants higher NGDP it needs only to declare its intentions and engage in Open Market Operations and let the market do most of the heavy lifting.
As long as the ECB does not recognize the NGDP problem in the EU there will be no solution from tinkering around the edges and adjustments in collateral requirements…
Thursday ~ December 1st, 2011 at 11:55 am
TC
Jeeze this post is awesome.
“Now obviously this pulls an enormous amount of risk on to the Fed. However, its not clear that there is any true risk involved here because the risk associated with a complete shutdown of the Periphery banking system is nearly existential.”
Shifting risk doesn’t eliminate it, right?
The thing that galls me is any default can be handled by the fed, but it just ends up being fiscal policy we should have here in the states given to europeans in the most back door manner imaginable.
Thursday ~ December 1st, 2011 at 1:21 pm
tv
Karl,
im a US Taxpayer.
Im a professional trader.
The Fed dollar swap for assets suggestion puts me – and the rest of us here across the pond in the US – on the hook.
For the value of EU assets.
Bailouts with the Abrogation of the Rule of Law – MERS, Outright Fraud, kleptocracy and an oligarchic, unsustainable FIRE based/centric US economy. Conservative savers/capital formers intentionally screwed to subside TBTF banks/financials that -themselves -promote regulatory capture. Fox meet henhouse.
We have some issues.
Now we potentially get even more issues – EU flavored.
And were on the financial hook.
I vote to pass on this dollar/EU asset swap. We have enough problems.
Everybody wants a bailout at someone else’s expense.
“But then risk greatly increases that the EU blows up and takes the US with it.”
Yes.
There is risk this happens anyways at any point in this whole fundamentally, structurally flawed Euro charade.
Yet, Id rather have unencumbered US dollars to use here at home in reserve for a Rainy Day.
Best
TV
PS Really enjoy your blog.
Thursday ~ December 1st, 2011 at 1:58 pm
David Pearson
Marcelo,
You are missing the point. Idiosyncratic risk (of individual bank failures) creates systemic risk. The ECB can reduce the systemic risk through OMO, but not the idiosyncratic one. That is because OMO does nothing to help failing institutions put up more collateral for Repo’s. So you have a lemons problem since its not clear exactly who is insolvent and who is just illiquid. The solution to a lemons problem is either: 1) have a pre-existing repo “FDIC” (too late); 2) recapitalize banks and nationalize where necessary (would lead to sovereign ratings downgrade); or 3) have the ECB guarantee all bank liabilities. Some variant of 2) and 3) worked, for now, in the U.S., but both are more problematic for Europe. Raising NGDP targets and carrying out OMO might help, but it is not the answer.
Thursday ~ December 1st, 2011 at 3:53 pm
Marcelo
David,
The problem with that is, I believe, that idiosyncratic risk of individual banks are derived from macroeconomic instability. As the price level falls and NGDP growth becomes increasingly small to negative what you see is that banks are going to become more risky because the loans they have are more likely to default — this creates the problem with interbank lending. If the ECB promises to increase NGDP in Italy, the government has a primary surplus, and the ECB will be buying lots of Italian debt to increase the money supply! I suppose it would also help for the ECB to say that it is a LOLR to the Italian government, but I do not think it is necessary…
If growth returns to italy then there is NO reason for anyone not to trust italian debt as collateral, which then should return the normal functioning of the financial system… Increasing liquidity or other bank based measures will only serve to patch up the problem, not solve it.
The real question here is do you think the ECB can legitimately raise NGDP if it wants to? I believe it absolutely can! And unless it does, I do not think any of these short term fixes are going to remove the risk from either the banking sector or the EU as a whole. Unfortunately, the terrible institutional design of the ECB makes this a very hazardous policy to pursue.
I believe that the problem at heart here is relatively simple to answer (set NGDP level target), but I do not think that it is likely, and perhaps even impossible policy outcome…. But trying to inject liquidity and stablize repo markets is not going to solve these problems, only prolong the eventual NGDP targeting (good), massive fiscal intervention (not as good), or break up (catastrophic) outcomes.
Thursday ~ December 1st, 2011 at 5:17 pm
David Pearson
Marcelo,
“idiosyncratic risk of individual banks are derived from macroeconomic instability.”
I disagree. That risk is instead a function of the outrageously high leverage (measured with tangible common equity and not excluding sovereign debt) of the E. banking system.
Thursday ~ December 1st, 2011 at 5:57 pm
Marcelo
David,
My thinking on this is that if the ECB set an NGDP target and did not ‘bail-out’ any banks, and perhaps became a LOLR to EU sovereigns that credit markets would have to unfreeze because of a combination of the declining risk of sov debt risk, increasing profitability of lending in the growing economy, and the satiation of the demand for money providing sufficient liqudity.
My guess is that all the bank problems are symptoms of low NGDP growth and bad prospects of future growth leading to hoarding of cash. Raise NGDP futures and markets return to full functionality…
Thursday ~ December 1st, 2011 at 6:03 pm
t
inflate/nGDP targeting, classic debt default, or some grey area combo of the two.
nGDP targeting moves the risk grenade from financial to the socio/political foundation.
Socio/political underpins. Everything.
Enjoy those leveraged societal ramifications…..
At least in a deflationary collapse .gov gets a strong currency to pay for basic necessities until the rebuild catches fire of its own accord.
Sunday ~ December 4th, 2011 at 1:59 pm
SNB’s Unintended Collateral Crunch and What QE Could Look Like? | Macro Exposure
[...] This is basically the problem, As your marginal cost of funds rises this is effectively monetary tightening. Yet, it is not managed by the central bank it is managed by the repo and securities lending markets. [...]