Steven Landsburg suggested that those who want to tax the rich should voluntarily pay more taxes themselves. I disagreed. Tyler Cowen responds
Karl Smith is irritated by the argument, but I don’t see that he offers a good response. In general the responses I read or hear to this argument show a lot of emotion and not a lot of recognition of the strongest versions of the claim. Even if this argument has a chance of truth of only 20 percent, that still should have force to alter behavior at the margin. “There is a twenty percent chance I am morally compelled to give” is a real nudge toward “I should give more now,” if only, say, giving a fifth of what the full argument requires. So “downgrade and dismiss” — a common rhetorical strategy — won’t work here. If the argument has any life at all, it should hang like a millstone around the neck of egalitarians.
The best response is to accept the argument and admit one’s partial moral inferiority: “The people who give more, yes, in some important ways they are better people than I am.”
I think Tyler is more or less correct here though I don’t know that we need the probabilistic language.
If you believe there is a moral duty to contribute towards helping the poor and you do not do so, then you bear moral responsibility.
My argument was less powerful than that. I suggest that a rich person can consistently favor taxes on the rich without volunteering to pay such taxes him or herself. The argument is simply that the world in which every rich person pays is preferable to me to the world in which no rich person pays which is preferable to me to the world in which only I pay.
Bryan Caplan pushes further asking under what conditions could someone suggest that there is a moral duty to tax the rich but not a moral duty for each individual rich person to volunteer taxes.
The simplest moral theory I can imagine that would justify Karl’s position says: (a) you’re morally obligated to obey the law, (b) morally obligated to support utility-maximizing laws, but (c) not morally obligated to unilaterally maximize utility. But just imagine making a populist protest sign consistent with this position. An egalitarian who defers to the law, does cost-benefit policy analysis, and refuses to go above and beyond the call of duty has become everything he hates.
So the obvious response – though I am not necessarily endorsing it – is that one has the following moral obligations:
A moral obligation to follow the law.
A moral obligation to advocate for laws one would have chosen in the Original Position.
A moral obligation to maximize the health and welfare of one’s family consistent with the law.
This would represent – I think - the revealed morality of most egalitarians. Is this what they hate?

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Friday ~ November 4th, 2011 at 4:41 pm
Benjamin Daniels
I wrote this on a similar topic (http://goo.gl/dXHVZ):
“But as I discussed in that previous post, the satisfaction of individual wants in the marketplace does not tell the whole story. Say we care about the distribution of income, but don’t think that we as individuals can do anything about it – which happens to be true. One charitable contribution does not move the needle appreciably, and so nobody is inclined to give of their own income to solve what everybody believes is a problem.
This means that we have two tiers of preferences. We have what neoclassicals term ‘revealed preferences’, which is the actions that individuals take in the free marketplace, and basically reflects the alignment of all their economic incentives. But it is also clear that there exists a second-order preference, in which individuals collectively believe that something ought to be different about their incentives so that they could effect a different aggregate outcome.
The way I see it, maximizing utility is about satisfying these collective desires, even if it means a lower level of ‘revealed preferences’ getting satisfied. As I discussed the other day in the Prisoners’ Dilemma problem, maximizing social happiness in fact means that nobody’s revealed preference is allowed – that is, every individual is frustrated that he is not allowed to defect in the game (because doing so would improve his payout), but on the whole, everyone is better off since nobody is allowed to.”
Friday ~ November 4th, 2011 at 5:10 pm
Adam Cohen (@acslater00)
“You have a responsibility to advocate for laws that will lead to egalitarian outcomes.”
Why?
“Because you have a responsibility to seek egalitarian outcomes due to the principle of original position”
Then why not seek them through individual action? Why not use charity?
“Because you have a responsibility to maximize your individual welfare consistent with the law.”
Then why do you also have a responsibility to seek laws which will reduce your individual welfare?
“Because you have a responsibility to seek egalitarian outcomes.”
See the problem here?
Friday ~ November 4th, 2011 at 5:31 pm
lfv
The simplest response, of course, is that one favors higher taxes because one favors more robust social welfare/whatever.
Without the latter being in place, why should one voluntarily increase their chance of misfortune by unilaterally paying higher taxes?
Friday ~ November 4th, 2011 at 5:40 pm
Wonks Anonymous
“A moral obligation to maximize the health and welfare of one’s family consistent with the law.”
No, I think there are things that are legal but they would recognize as unethical which would serve that end.
Friday ~ November 4th, 2011 at 7:00 pm
Lord
If you have the moral obligation to advocate for laws, you may may not wish to contribute to charity as this would weaken advocacy of them. More commonly, charity may be desirable but not as desirable as the laws.
Friday ~ November 4th, 2011 at 7:19 pm
Steve the hyena
What Caplan leaves out, strangely for an economist relatively focused on bias and knowledge issues, is that most people probably have no idea how much their beliefs demand from them in monetary terms. This is a technical problem: a website that took your income, tax and policy preferences into account would be able to roughly estimate how much you should donate and to whom. Using a site like Givewell, it could recommend charities and corresponding amounts.
Friday ~ November 4th, 2011 at 7:54 pm
Wagster
This is is similar to the argument made by doves when it comes to war… that if you back a war you should be willing to sign up to fight in it. The argument is weak in that case, and it’s weak here. We’re discussing policy, not personal virtue.
Saturday ~ November 5th, 2011 at 6:03 pm
lfvoss
No, it would be similar to the non-existent argument that if you back starting a war, you ought to go start fighting it regardless of what the government does.
I don’t recall anyone suggesting that Rush Limbaugh ought to lead an elite squad into Iraq even if the US did not invade.
Friday ~ November 4th, 2011 at 8:06 pm
Becky Hargrove
And my argument is less powerful than all of these because I think too much in practical terms, to understand the moral philosophical implications of these arguments (too many years scraping for a living atrophied my brain somewhat). What does that mean, in my preferred practical terms? That redistribution from the government to lower incomes no longer works because the divide has become too great. As a person with little money, all I ask for is the chance to rebuild an economic environment that people such as myself can survive in, thrive in, and be economically connected in. That is not the same thing as government handouts or charity, because as any person in my position can tell others, we want to be strong enough to give back, as well. It sucks when we find ourselves on the receiving end, decades before we were ready. (Is any middle aged or elderly person ever really ready?) Just give us a chance to create a new economic floor, to stand on, be strong, and once again able to reach out to the world.
Friday ~ November 4th, 2011 at 11:22 pm
What Would Render Libertarians (or Austrians) Hypocrites?
[...] geeconosphere exchange going on, dating back to a post Steve Landsburg made in April. (HT2 Karl Smith) Steve wrote: Just a couple of days ago, President Obama excoriated the Republican Congress for [...]
Saturday ~ November 5th, 2011 at 11:46 am
BSEconomist
On a couple of dimensions, Cowen and Caplan are involved in an intellectual slight of hand. First, it is simultaneously impossible to maximize preferences over social outcomes and individual outcomes. By trying to combine the two into a single preference relation, they create the appearance of inconsistency when there is one. Frankly, I am disappointed in you that you didn’t fight back against what I would consider slander on the part of Cowen/Caplan. I think we should all stay away from arguments which imply that those who disagree with us are hypocritical.
The slight of hand works two ways. First, think of egalitarian outcomes as a pure public good which people generally have idiosyncratic preferences over. It is literally a homework problem for an intermediate undergraduate class to show that each individual’s own contribution to a public good can go to zero even pareto maximum goes to infinity. “We will all be better off if we can together commit to contributing” is a perfectly moral position. Intuitively, each person recognizes that their own contribution is too small to make a difference and that others will freeload on their contribution. Which is to say it is rational to not contribute oneself, but still recognize that everyone together should. So the slight of hand I mentioned is that if you can’t accept this as a moral outcome; why is it that you think ANY utility maximization is “moral”? Frankly, I think utility maximization is morally neutral–it should be understood as the greed motive together with a myopic view of non-strictly-economic outcomes, which brings me to my second point.
The second slight of hand is more fundamental. As I already suggested, utility maximization in the market is nothing more or less than the greed motive for individuals. There is something a little fishy (or more precisely, completely wrong) about comparing these greed-based market outcomes with non-greed-based motives which cannot be understood entirely as occuring in the market. Let’s call these “motives” as well. I have preferences over community outcomes, perhaps; or perhaps I have a “motive” associated with each of Jonathan Haidt’s moral dimensions. At any rate–whatever the details–simultaneously maximizing one’s own greed motive and the community motive is an impossibility since the community motive cannot be satiated by individual market interactions–by definition! Now, how choices are actually made in the presence of multiple motives each on different dimensions is something I’m working on, but I can say a couple of things whether that project pans out or not. First, maximizing the community motive (preferences over community outcomes) could involve advocacy even of actions one would not take by oneself. If this advocacy involves actions which would hurt oneself if implemented, then this is a sign of the strength of the community motive over the greed motive–that is; it is a sign of moral strength, not weakness. Finally, since the individual action makes no improvement for the community (approximately) but a big difference for the greed motive, the lack of individual action in the face of no community action is entirely irrelevant–the perception of powerlessness at best. (Incidently, the revealed preferences would make the community motive look a lot like a public good). That is the second slight of hand they engage in… mixing up morality with the greed motive to begin with. Human beings are not so simple.
Saturday ~ November 5th, 2011 at 6:03 pm
Steven E. Landsburg
I suggest that a rich person can consistently favor taxes on the rich without volunteering to pay such taxes him or herself
This, I think, is clearly true and ought to be noncontroversial. The interesting question is whether we ought to approve of the moral stance that leads to this set of preferences.
Sunday ~ November 6th, 2011 at 12:27 pm
TheMoneyIllusion » Interesting links
[...] Karl Smith points out (correctly) that just because progressives are hypocrites, doesn’t mean they are [...]
Sunday ~ November 6th, 2011 at 9:41 pm
Link roundup « Negative Interest
[...] – Karl Smith: Cowen and Caplan on Voluntary Taxes [...]
Tuesday ~ November 8th, 2011 at 11:26 am
Colonialism, Tax Cuts, Redistributionists, and Other Links | John Goodman's Health Policy Blog | NCPA.org
[...] Karl Smith: just because progressives are hypocrites, doesn’t mean they are wrong. [...]
Friday ~ November 11th, 2011 at 10:39 am
Xerographica
If anybody has a chance I’ve got a few questions regarding a different approach to this problem… http://pragmatarianism.blogspot.com/2011/11/pragmatarian-questions.html
Friday ~ June 8th, 2012 at 10:22 pm
Rahel
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