Kelly writes
First, it is tempting, but probably mistaken, to assume the Great Recession came along and knocked the U.S. off an otherwise sustainable growth track. It wasn’t an external shock, but internal weakness, that led to the economy’s collapse.
One worrying aspect of GDP growth prior to 2007 was that it came even as real household incomes stagnated. Assuming that boom-era growth rates were sustainable, and not fueled by a surge in house prices and a credit boom that simply pulled forward demand from the future, is a huge leap in logic.
This, I believe, misunderstands the concept of aggregate demand.
Regular demand measures how much of something people are willing to buy given its price in terms of other stuff. That other stuff is competing goods, their labor, their assets, etc.
Aggregate Demand measure the total amount people want to buy given the price index. But, the price index is the cost of all goods in terms of money. This is explicitly a nominal measure.
For real demand of something to be too low, the real demand of something else would have to be too high.
Said another way the recession makes no sense as a response to a country that is fundamentally overextended. That’s because the US economy isn’t overworked, its underworked.
In 2007 138 Million Americans were working and producing stuff. US industrial capacity was running at around 80%. Office vacancy rates were running at about 12%. And, the US was producing around 11 million motor vehicles a year.
By 2009 – at the bottom of the recession – 129 million Americans were working. Industrial capacity was running at 67%. Office vacancies were running at 18% and the US was producing around 5 million motor vehicles a year.
So in those two years 9 million people stopped going to work. 13% of our factories and utilities shutdown. 6% of our offices were emptied out. And, our car companies churned out fewer than half as many vehicles.
There is no sense to the idea that if we were over-extended and had bought too much that what we should do in response is work and create less.
If you think about how a nation as whole gets over-extended it makes perfect sense how this would work. If the US as a whole were living beyond its means that means that we were borrowing money from abroad.
Suppose that suddenly came to a stop. China or whomever else decided they no longer wanted to fund profligate American consumption. The Chinese would dump US assets, the value of the US dollar would fall and the value of the Chinese Yuan would rise.
The price of Chinese goods in America would rise causing American consumption to fall. We would have to buy less foreign goods. At, the same time price of American goods in China would collapse and the Chinese would buy more American goods.
The net result would be that demand for American goods would rise and with it American employment. However, the consumption of foreign goods by Americans would fall.
In the end Americans would be working more and consuming less. Which is precisely what should happen if you have over-extended yourself. You should cut back on your own consumption and do more work.
However, that is not what is happening now. Americans are doing less work. This is in part because far from contracting the credit they are extending to America, foreigners have been more than willing to increase lending to America and the US dollar rose during the crisis rather than falling.
What’s happened instead is nominal shock. The circulation of money within the United States ground to a halt because of difficulties at the institutions responsible for turning savings into borrowing, banks. This causes savings to pile up while borrowing goes undone.
The result is that the economic wheel slows down. We have at once people consuming less and producing less. We have an economy where there is simply less exchange going on. It’s a less economy, economy and that’s reflected in the collapse of nominal GDP. What the Fed needs to do is to get our economy back; to get the dollar value of total exchange back to where it was before.

7 comments
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Wednesday ~ October 26th, 2011 at 5:26 pm
John B. Chilton (@uaeeconomist)
I’ll disagree and be happy to have you shoot down my conjecture. The real estate bubble caused the public to believe it was wealthier than it was and spending was elevated as a result. When the bubble burst individuals redid their permanent income calculations and reduced current consumption. That’s not a reversal of “pulled consumption from the future” but it looks something like it. We were collectively spending beyond our means. We were “fundamentally overextended” — and I’m not referring to the Federal budget.
Now we’re producing well below our means of course and have resources that are idled.
Wednesday ~ October 26th, 2011 at 6:00 pm
KH
>> There is no sense to the idea that if we were over-extended and had bought too much that what we should do in response is work and create less.
But what about housing? Pre-crisis we had a rapidly increasing stock of housing “wealth.” That “wealth” was sharply reduced by the financial crisis, thereby reducing the propensity (wealth effect) and means (equity withdraw) to consume. That’s a question, not a statement of fact, because measuring the effect of loss of housing “wealth” on the propensity to consume is no easy matter, at least for me.
Wednesday ~ October 26th, 2011 at 6:56 pm
Marcus Nunes
KH There was no “rapidly increasing stock of housing weath”. From the ealy 1990s on, the per capita stock of houses has remained constant. The rise in house construction was tied to the big rise in population also after the early 1990s due to immigration.
Wednesday ~ October 26th, 2011 at 7:20 pm
Andy Harless
Re-reading Kelly Evans’ statement, it doesn’t sound necessarily wrong to me. “a surge in house prices and a credit boom…pulled forward demand from the future.” A statement about pulling forward demand from the future is a statement about the time preferences of the demanders. I would argue that that both this Lesser Depression and the previous recession were caused by a problem with time preference, namely excessive patience, and that this problem existed even during the intervening boom. (Excessive patience is a problem because of the expectation that money provides a reliable store of value, thus causing people to hoard it when they become excessively patient, and because prices and wages are sticky, so that this hoarding results in recessions.)
However, during the boom we managed to deceive people into acting out of accord with their excessive patience, because (1) they believed they were richer than the really were (“a [temporary] surge in house prices”) and (2) they believed that their assets were safer than they really were (“a credit boom” facilitated by packaging credit risk into ostensibly safe assets), so that they believed themselves richer still in risk-adjusted terms. We literally “pulled forward demand from the future” by deceiving people into doing consumption today that they would (had they known their actual budget constraint) have preferred to do in the future. (Also, the credit boom pulled forward demand by changing the budget constraint faced by the less patient, by means of deceiving the patient into lending to them.)
Wednesday ~ October 26th, 2011 at 7:51 pm
Lord
We over invested in what we thought was housing only to find it debt when prices fell leaving us overextended, but investments that lose money can’t be redeemed by making more of them. Instead we must find something else that can be profitable, resulting in slowdown or recession until we can do so. Housing prices were divorced from reality and incomes and the Fed could not have sustained them because the pyramid had run out of new entrants, but that is not to say they could not have targeted ngdp and assisted in the transition, through lowering the value of the dollar if nothing else, only that the future would look different from the past and would take time to adjust particularly with the debt overhang.
Thursday ~ October 27th, 2011 at 1:37 pm
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Friday ~ October 28th, 2011 at 5:59 pm
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