From the depths of the recession which began in 2007, and severely intensified in 2008:Q3, there has been an ever-growing chorus of (minority) opinion in the blogosphere regarding the nature of the recession, the causes, and the proper prescription for returning the economy to growth. The practitioners of this style of macroeconomics have since been dubbed the “quasi-monetarist” school, of which I consider myself a member. “Quasi-monetarism” has always been a somewhat unsatisfactory title for this group of thinkers, but it has stuck — so far.
Lars Christensen, however, seeks to change that in a new working paper entitled “Market Monetarism: The Second Monetarist Counter-Revolution“, in which he lays out the core tenets of the quasi-monetarist market monetarist view. I will lay out some of the quotes from the paper here, also check out his post at Marcus Nunes’ blog.
The Birth of Market Monetarism
Market Monetarists generally describe recessions within a Monetary Disequilibrium Theory framework in line with what has been outlined by orthodox monetarists such as Leland Yeager (1956) and Clark Warburton (1966). David Laidler has also been important in shaping the views of Market Monetarists (particularly Nick Rowe) on the causes of recessions and the general monetary transmission mechanism.
Put simply, the “market monetarist” view of money says that in a monetary exchange economy every market is a n+1 market, and an excess supply of all goods constitutes an excess demand for the medium of exchange. Thus, the market monetarist view of recessions is that recessions are always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon.
Another key feature of Market Monetarists (and probably the feature from which Lars derived the name) is our determination of the stance of monetary policy, for which we look to market indicators of the trend rate of NGDP:
Markets Matter
In a world of monetary disequilibrium, one cannot observe whether monetary conditions are tight or loose. However, one can observe the consequences of tight or loose monetary policy. If money is tight then nominal GDP tends to fall — or growth is slower. Similarly, excess demand for money will also be visible in other markets such as the stock market, the foreign exchange market, commodity markets, and the bond markets. Hence, for Market Monetarists, the dictum is Money and Markets Matter.
The use of market indicators of the stance and expectations of the future path of monetary policy (as opposed to short-term interest rates) is one of the defining features of the Market Monetarist movement, and it is very important from a practical standpoint. Many errors in reasoning in business/economic news stem from one line of reasoning: “low interest rates = easy money”.
Against Neo-Wicksellian Analysis
Mainstream economists and particularly New Keynesian economists place interest rates at the core of monetary policy. Furthermore, central banks mostly formulate monetary policy with an interest rates framework. Market Moentarists — as tradition monetarists — are highly critical of this approach to monetary policy and monetary analysis, which Nick Rowe has termed Neo-Wicksellian analysis (Rowe 2009).
Market Monetarists particularly object to the use of interest rates as the measure of monetary policy “tightness”…
…This view of course is in stark contrast to the prevailing New Keynesian orthodoxy where low interest rates are seen as loose monetary policy and have a significant impact on how monetary policy is analysed.
As Scott Sumner, and I believe Nick Rowe have pointed out, the movement of interest rates is just one of many effects of monetary policy. Though because interest rates are immediate and visible (indeed, the interest rate on reserves is an administered rate), we are often “tricked” into thinking interest rates are the dog, not the tail.
Interest Rates are NOT the Price of Money
A very common fallacy among both economists and layment is to see interest rates as the price of money. however, Market Monetarists object strongly to this perception. As Scott Sumner spells on in capitals: “INTEREST RATES ARE NOT THE PRICE OF MONEY, THEY ARE THE PRICE OF CREDIT” (Sumner 2011C). On the other hand, the price of money or rather the value of money is defined by what money can buy: goods. Hend, the price of money is the inverse of the price of all other goods — approximated by the inverse of for example consumer prices…
…Bill Woolsey: “An increase in the supply of credit isn’t the same thing as an increase in the quantity of money. While it is possible that new money is lent into existence, raising the quantity of money over a period of time while augmenting the supply of credit, it is also possible for the supply of credit to rise without an increase in the quantity of money. Purchases of new corporate bonds by households or firms, for example, add to the supply of credit without adding to the quantity of money”
While there is a relationship between the supply and demand for money and credit, they are not the same thing.
The Liquidity Trap Fallacy
My favorite, since I’ve been a vocal opponent of the concept of the “liquidity trap”:
In line iwth the reasoning on interest rates above is the Market Monetarist’s rejection of the so-called liquidity trap. Almost every day the financial media quot economists claiming that central banks are running out of ammunition because interest rates are close to zero. This is the so-called liquidity trap. Market Monetarists object strongly to perception that monetary policy is ineffective at rates close to zero. If one single issue has dominated Market Monetarist blogs over the last couple of years, it has been that monetary policy is highly efficient in terms of influencing the nominal economic variables such as nominal GDP or the price level. Market Monetarists do not believe there is a liquidity trap [1]. This is consistent with traditional monetarist teaching (see for example Friedman 1997).
[1] This annotation was added by myself in an attempt to explain what is going on with the concept of the liquidity trap, which has a very slippery definition. Being fair, the original concept of the “liquidity trap” — that of Keynes — pertains to the effect of the so-called “conventional monetary policy instrument” (open market purchases of short-term government debt) on raising the “conventional monetary policy indicator” (inflation) [Update: at the zero lower bound].
However, “conventional monetary policy” is a construct, the same way that other “conventional policies” instituted by governments is a construct. The only “trap” involved is the “trap” imposed by conventional thinking.
Market Monetarism rather than Quasi-Monetarism
Throughout this paper I ahve used the term Market Monetarism. However, none of the five main Market Monetarist bloggers uses this term. Instead, they in general use the term Quasi-Monetarist to describe their views. I am critical of this term, as it does not say anything about the school other than it is a sort of monetarism. “Quasi” undoubtedly also makes it sound like a half-baked version of an economic school.
An economic school’s name naturally should represent the key views of the school. The Monetarist part is obvious as there is a very significant overlap with traditional monetarism. The difference between Market Monetarism and traditional monetarism, however, is the rejection of money supply targeting and the assumption about the stability of velocity is at the core of MArket Monetarists’ reformulation of monetarism.
Instead of monetary aggregates and stability of velocity, Market Monetarists advocate the use of markets as an indicator of monetary (dis)equilibrium. Furthermore, Market Monetarists advocate using market instruments such as NGDP futures, and in the case of William Woolsey — free banking — as a tool to stabilize the policy objective (nominal GDP).
Do read the paper, as it is an interest crash-course in the economic dialog and thinking in the “Market Monetarist” corner of the blogosphere, and includes a possible research agenda. Though I am not mentioned at all in the paper (sad face!), I do consider myself of the “Market Monetarist” school, and I think that the name works well enough. What do you guys think of the name?
P.S. If I have any contribution to make, I suppose it would be my suggestion to redefine inflation as celerity.
P.P.S. If the quotes aren’t exact, it is because I had to type them myself. Acrobat, incidentally, is not a very friendly medium. The full paper should be posted as a blog post! I’d be willing to do it here, if Lars gives me the permission!

17 comments
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Tuesday ~ September 13th, 2011 at 9:47 pm
georgesblog360
Perhaps it’s my role to be the wet blanket on every discussion of fiat currency economies. I may be too far outside the box to take anything inside it, seriously. I’m convinced that I spent too much time playing Monopoly, as a child. In fact, I posted one of my bad dreams as a blog. If you’ve ever been in a game in which one of the players demanded their way, because they actually owned the game, you understand how reality can upset the rules of the game. If you’ve been in a game in which one of the players brought currency from his game at home, you understand how factions can warp the balance in the system. I’d like to think that rules are rules, but the possibility of outside forces exerting improper influence in the game disturbs me enough to question the validity of any fiat system. I can’t imagine myself in a game of Monopoly with Geithner, Greenspan and Bernanke. I would title that, “Georgesblog and The 401k Thieves”.
Tuesday ~ September 13th, 2011 at 10:01 pm
Anon
So you deny that there’s a liquidity trap – but you do not define it – and indeed there’s no need to define it as the liquidity trap has been described and defined for over 70 years.
The classic definition of the liquidity trap goes back to 1937: we are in a liquidity trap if the central bank’s interest rate is at essentially zero and it cannot lower it below zero, into negative rates, despite all signals shouting: ease, ease, ease.
The claim is that if the recession is deep enough then the central bank becomes “trapped” at around the zero lower bound: its monetary tool of open market buying bonds for newly created monetary base has little effect: it does not lower real rates into significantly negative territory.
What I don’t understand about the “market monetarist” position: what exactly is there to deny about this? These are all observed facts. The Fed has dramatically increased the monetary base, but real rates are still around zero – instead of the necessary minus 4%-6%.
So the liquidity trap is as real as it gets.
Tuesday ~ September 13th, 2011 at 10:29 pm
Niklas Blanchard
Hmm, I seem to have been typing too much to realize that I didn’t specify the zero lower bound…and in fact, that is the definition of the “liquidity trap” that I accept…and I still think the concept is useless.
First, there is the characterization of the monetary policy instrument as short-term interest rates, which is a simple construct. There is nothing in nature that says that the central bank should target inflation as the indicator and use short term interest rates as the instrument. But that is more in the abstract…
…you say that “these are are a observed facts”, however, they are not so clear-cut. Keynes, in the General Theory, was not at all concise regarding the liquidity trap, and in fact only mentions the 1932 open market operations as a possibility that monetary stimulus is ineffective at zero interest rates (though he seemed to believe so)…but we know now that the problem was the sterilization of international gold flows. Japan in the 1990′s/2000′s was an example of Japan’s inability to commit to monetary stimulus (see Bernanke). Even in New Keynesian theory, an increase in the monetary base expected to be permanent will have an impact on NGDP…this was proven by the Roosevelt’s 1933 devaluation.
Those to experiences are the only examples in recent times of what could be considered a “liquidity trap”…along with today, however, interest rates on reserves are not zero.
And of course, you can add the “conventional monetary policy” requirement, but that just makes the problem with the original definition of a liquidity trap is a problem of convention, not an actual “trap”.
Wednesday ~ September 14th, 2011 at 7:23 am
Anon
Niklas:
If you are using the term “liquidity trap” you should use the definition the rest of us have been using for decades:
A situation in which prevailing interest rates are low and savings rates are high.
And those two things are facts, the desire for money is still very high, compared to before the crisist:
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/graph/fredgraph.png?&id=PSAVERT&scale=Left&range=Custom&cosd=2006-01-01&coed=2011-07-01&line_color=%230000ff&link_values=false&line_style=Solid&mark_type=NONE&mw=4&lw=1&ost=-99999&oet=99999&mma=0&fml=a&fq=Monthly&fam=avg&fgst=lin&transformation=lin&vintage_date=2011-09-14&revision_date=2011-09-14
And interest rates are still zero:
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/graph/fredgraph.png?&id=FEDFUNDS&scale=Left&range=Custom&cosd=2006-07-01&coed=2011-08-01&line_color=%230000ff&link_values=false&line_style=Solid&mark_type=NONE&mw=4&lw=1&ost=-99999&oet=99999&mma=0&fml=a&fq=Monthly&fam=avg&fgst=lin&transformation=lin&vintage_date=2011-09-14&revision_date=2011-09-14
If you want to use a different definition then you should not attempt to re-define the ages-old definition of a “liquidity trap”. You should define your own term: “Niklasian liquidity condition” and then you can all claim that it does not exist, as defined by yourself.
Nick:
The Fed is restricted by the Federal Reserve Act to not be able to conduct fiscal policy. Thus it can not affect (R)GDP directly – all it can do is buy and sell bonds (or bond-equivalents).
The scope of those bonds is roughly 7 trillion dollars. The Fed has roughly half of them already on its balance sheet. This is how far central bank policy can go in a liquidity trap – as the Bank of Japan has learned it the hard way.
This is the real-rates effect 3 trillion dollars of QE was able to achieve:
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/graph/?s%5B1%5D%5Bid%5D=WTP5A12
A -2.5% real rate for these bonds, and it popped right back up to 0 again once QE ended. And it only affect financial instruments – it has not trickled over into the real economy and has not reduced people’s desire to hold money.
The output gap is 6% at minimum. Do you see the problem?
So if you think the Fed could do something please come up with a specific channel. Buy another trillion of bonds? That will only move real rates to -1% and back to zero again we are once it stops.
These are the hard facts – if you see some other reality than the rest of us then please link to actual data – not words and explanations.
Tuesday ~ September 13th, 2011 at 10:16 pm
TheMoneyIllusion » Market monetarism?
[...] I keep forgetting to include Niklas Blanchard, who is also a quasi (market?) monetarist. Perhaps I forget because Karl Smith tends to dominate [...]
Tuesday ~ September 13th, 2011 at 10:44 pm
georgesblog360
A liquidity trap is built into every fiat currency. In the case of the Federal Reserve note, it is all debt. The money to repay it never existed. At one time, there was real money, held as surety for the dcurrency, but that horse left the barn, long ago. The Federal Reserve is in a perpetual liquidity trap. There is no escape. Resistance is futile.
Tuesday ~ September 13th, 2011 at 10:59 pm
Nick Rowe
Niklas: It’s good to have you with us. Lars is probably sleeping right now. It’s very late in denmark!
Anon: there is a lot more to monetary policy than what the central bank does right now.
Tuesday ~ September 13th, 2011 at 11:31 pm
João Marcus Marinho Nunes
Nick Rowe
He´s vacationing in Mallorca! It´s just as late over there!
Tuesday ~ September 13th, 2011 at 11:13 pm
My Twist on Market Monetarism « Increasing Marginal Utility
[...] macroeconomics blogs are a-thunder with what is perhaps the first school of macro born not of books or academic [...]
Tuesday ~ September 13th, 2011 at 11:17 pm
Lee Kelly
The so-called liquidity trap is an creation of central banks. It’s like observing that I can’t run because I have decided to lie down instead. Doubtless true, but then why don’t I just get up? The constraint of lying down is one of my own creation, and it is the only thing stopping me from running.
That’s what a liquidity trap is to a central bank — it has just decided to lie down. Meanwhile, people come to believe this immobility must actually be an inherent constraint — the central bank is paralysed and couldn’t get up even if it wanted to. Some central bankers even come to believe this themselves and do not even try to get up, or they even decide that they are better off lying down after all — running is dangerous, especially for someone who has spent their entire lives lying down.
Can I stretch this metaphor even further? Yes. Will I? No.
Wednesday ~ September 14th, 2011 at 12:11 am
Benny Lava
Ever since the debate with mises.org was announced the comments here have gotten weird. Like that time Homer Simpson watched Charlie Rose weird.
Wednesday ~ September 14th, 2011 at 3:13 am
FT Alphaville » Further reading
[...] – On market monetarism… [...]
Wednesday ~ September 14th, 2011 at 4:48 am
Lars Christensen
Niklas, thanks for the very kind word. I will be very happy and proud if you post my paper on your blog. Drop me a mail and I will be happy to send you the Word version of the paper.
Wednesday ~ September 14th, 2011 at 5:40 pm
Niklas Blanchard
Anon:
I’ll be happy to use whatever definition of the liquidity trap you see fit. How you defined it above is how I also defined it: a situation arising at the zero lower bound where infinitely elastic demand for money causes the monetary policy instrument (currently “the” short-term interest rate) to have (very little to) no effect on the monetary policy indicator (inflation).
However, that doesn’t save the relevance of the concept of the liquidity trap at all. In the “Market Monetarist” basic monetary framework, changes in short term interest rates play a negligent role in the monetary transmission mechanism. In the “Woodfordian” NK model, expectations of the future path of interest rates is the transmission mechanism. In the “Market Monetarist” model, expected changes in the supply and demand for base money is the transmission mechanism. More importantly, there has never been a bank in the history of the world that has tried and found itself unable to raise NGDP, or rather, found itself in a “liquidity trap”.
In the Market Monetarist framework, the central bank should always be setting policy in each period such that the market expects that some measure of nominal spending (I use NGDP) will remain on target in future periods…and that is what (in our view) should be considered conventional policy. This renders the liquidity trap an artifact of a particular model that doesn’t include expectations (although Paul Krugman subsequently modeled an “expectations trap”), a social convention…and irrelevant. That was the point of that section of the OP.
Wednesday ~ September 14th, 2011 at 9:01 pm
Rob
.” If the quotes aren’t exact, it is because I had to type them myself. Acrobat, incidentally, is not a very friendly medium. The full paper should be posted as a blog post! I’d be willing to do it here, if Lars gives me the permission!”
To cut and paste from a pdf file using adobe:just (from the top menus)
tools->select&zoom->select tool
This will allow you to highlight the areas you need to select to cut and paste
Wednesday ~ September 14th, 2011 at 10:30 pm
Niklas Blanchard
Thanks Rob!
Tuesday ~ October 11th, 2011 at 12:56 am
Sometimes (Macro) History Bites — Clearing and Settlement
[...] the so-called “market monetarist” school argues that the monetary stimulus hasn’t been sufficient (advocates for fiscal stimulus [...]