Via Brad Delong, Buce of Underbelly is upset about the proposed terms of a BAC bailout.
Translated: okay, so equity gets hosed, which is just as it should be in insolvency. But it sounds like we will be paying $100 bill for something. And that would be? Why, the bondholders, I suppose–who else could it be, with numbers like this and on terms like this. It’s been the one abiding principle throughout the Geithner–no matter how parlous the state of whatever, no bondholder gets left behind. Apparently we need to say it again, guys: capitalism means the risk of failure, and real failure when things go bad. Bank bailouts that protect bondholders are ring-fencing for which the rest of us pay. Sheesh, is that so hard to understand?
No, I think this is wrong. I do not know why there is an enormous externality associated with letting bondholders get hosed. It is one of the great questions of our age.
However, I can recognize an empirical regularity when I see it. The bondholders should be saved when possible. To misquote Mark Twain: its no wonder truth is stranger than economic models. Economic models have to make sense.
Yet, we live in the real world. Not in the model. When someone finds actual empirical evidence of moral hazard on the part of credit holders causing crises we can talk. For now we have definitive evidence of massive credit losses causes crises and that’s what policy should be based on.

4 comments
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Thursday ~ August 25th, 2011 at 1:44 am
TGGP
Can you point to an overview on where the stylized facts of bondholder-hosing come from?
Thursday ~ August 25th, 2011 at 2:38 am
Lorenzo from Oz
Holders of equity get to vote on who runs the company. Bondholders don’t. Since they lack control, if bondholders are “punished” the only response they have is to be more reluctant to provide credit. So, I am not surprised if the effects of “punishing” provision of credit is more negative (due to being prone to “freezing up”) than punishing equity.
Thursday ~ August 25th, 2011 at 10:53 am
IVV
I still don’t see why bondholders shouldn’t bear some risk of loss. Not for moral hazard reasons, but because that’s the nature of the deal they went into. Are we better served by having a system in which we say one thing (bondholders accept a risk of default and demand higher interest rates to compensate for that risk) and do another (bondholders have no risk of default, because in the even of default the government will make them whole)?
That’s just asking for all sorts of mistakes and shenanigans.
Thursday ~ August 25th, 2011 at 1:07 pm
banjosupreme
Maybe it’s unreasonable to ask for empirical evidence beforehand.