Not quite.
Back in 2009 John Cochrane debated Scott Sumner about the causes of the crisis, and pushed back pretty heavily against Scott’s interpretation that by 2008:Q3, money had become too tight relative to the needs of the economy. He made a few salient points, but ultimately I wasn’t very persuaded by Cochrane’s position. However, his recent paper, which is poised to be all the rage (or cause all the rage?) sooner or later, he makes a mention of the monetary disequilibrium in this passage:
Why did a financial crisis lead to such a big recession? We understand how a surge in money demand, if not accommodated by the Fed, can lead to a decline in output. I argue that we saw something similar — a “flight to quality,” a surge in the demand for all government debt and away from goods, services and private debt. In the fiscal context of (1), this event corresponds to a decrease in the discount rate for government debt. Many of the Government’s policies can be understood as ways to accommodate this demand, which a conventional swap of money for government debt does not address. This story is in contrast to “lending channel” or “financial frictions” stories for the recession, essentially falls in aggregate supply.
(I want to preface this by saying that I have only skimmed the paper so far, so Cochrane may have addressed this issue at some point)
I want to argue that these things aren’t similar in a way where you can separate the two, and claim that a “flight to quality” is a fundamentally substitutable concept with monetary disequilibrium. In fact, analyzing a “flight to quality” phenomenon as a cause is kind of foreign to me. As far as I’m concerned, any level and composition of debt structure is an effect. If there is a “flight to quality”, which depresses the yields on nominal bonds, it is almost assuredly the macro-effect of some (or many) other cause(s). The most likely (in the case of the recent recession) being an commodity price appreciation filtering into core CPI, causing the Fed — using its backwards-looking indicators — to target interest rates at a level that was patently too high for the macroeconomic conditions developing in the real-life economy. In other words monetary disequilibrium, exactly as Cochrane said in the quote.
Now there may, indeed, be some people out there that wake up on random day X, and decide that they want to drastically increase their holdings of government debt…however, I don’t think that this odd behavior is an aggregate phenomenon. Therefore, a “flight to quality” is necessarily an effect of some other variable. Cochrane seems to reject the “lending channel” and “financial frictions” models of the recession…but on the same token, he doesn’t seem to embrace the “tight money” model. So, from what I’ve read, this seems to leave him in a position of arguing that an effect is a cause.
My question is, why does he so strongly wish to reject the tight money interpretation? Isn’t it in his intellectual ‘bloodline’ so-to-speak to always be suspect of the money supply, and if not the money supply the aggregates…and if not the aggregates, some other measure of the stance of monetary policy that isn’t the Fed’s nominal interest rate? What would Milton Friedman say?
The most likely answer is that I’ve missed something.
P.S. I’m starting the analysis from 2008:Q3…which I suppose is a stylistic approach which would make my argument the same as Cochrane’s. Starting earlier may make tight money look like an effect — but Cochrane’s “flight to quality” from 2006-2008 wasn’t causing as many problems as the flight to quality which happened very suddenly in 2008:Q3-4, when the recession deeply intensified.
Update: It had been a while since I listened to the Sumner/Cochrane debate, so I decided to read Sumner’s take again. It turns out, this paper is actually an academic manifestation of the points he made during the debate:
I can’t bear to watch myself, so I’ll rely on memory. There seemed to be three areas where Cochrane had trouble accepting my views:
1. He couldn’t understand how I could claim monetary policy was “tight” last fall.
2. He was skeptical that the Fed could do much to create inflation, at least if its tools were restricted to things like setting an explicit inflation target, negative rates in ERs, and quantitative easing. He does believe that a combined fiscal/monetary “helicopter drop” could get the job done. And I recall that his first choice was having the Fed buy riskier assets.
3. He also worried about overshooting toward high inflation.
Also, Bennett McCaullum has been highly critical of the Fiscal Theory of the Price level, and is definitely worth reading.

6 comments
Comments feed for this article
Tuesday ~ June 22nd, 2010 at 7:29 am
The Money Demand Blog
This is the key quote from Cochranes latest paper:
“In short, something like the “special” or “liquidity” services we usually associate with money applied to all government debt for these central actors. Those services were related to liquidity, transparency on balance sheets, acceptability as collateral, and absolute security of nominal repayment, rather than the acceptability as means of payment in transactions that we usually emphasize in money-demand theories.”
Basically, government debt is as good as money because of the popularity of repo transactions.
Tuesday ~ June 22nd, 2010 at 1:53 pm
Niklas Blanchard
But I don’t think you can base causality on the fact that demand shifted from money to a substitute, there had to be something that caused that shift.
I’ve never been comfortable with the fiscal theory of the price level, as it flies in the face of my intuition. It seems to me to be a theory whose assumptions make it de facto true; for example: for the FTPL to hold true, the government needs to commit to a non-Ricardian expansion of debt…but to know that the government is running such a policy, we have to know whether it is satisfied for all unobserved prices. Of course, this is impossible.
Cochrane seems to say in the paper that inflation can only happen under a regime of significant monetary expansion paired with a significant (non-Ricardian) fiscal expansion…which, of course, would satisfy the conditions that we face right now, and there is not even a hint of inflation. I suppose he counters this by saying that “we’re at the edge of a cliff, but we won’t know it until we fall”…which could be true, but I’ll stick with my money-demand theories.
Tuesday ~ June 22nd, 2010 at 4:35 pm
The Money Demand Blog
Money and government debt were almost perfect substitutes way before the crisis. The technological reason for the enormous increase in the substitutability was repo market. If we take the monetarist model, we have to somehow include treasuries in the monetary aggregates if we want the model to continue to work.
Tuesday ~ June 22nd, 2010 at 3:49 pm
TheMoneyIllusion » John Cochrane’s view of the recession
[...] this post was inspired by another post called “Is John Cochrane Sumnerian Now?“ I vaguely recall that he had a more finance-oriented view of the recession when we debated [...]
Wednesday ~ June 23rd, 2010 at 3:34 am
Niklas Blanchard
123:
When I think of cash in the monetarist model, I think of the monetary base and supply as measured by an aggregate like MZM. To the extent that risk-free interest-bearing debt was substitutable for cash I would still view the transaction in terms of the actual hand-to-hand cash demand (Russ Roberts, next video maybe?). So whether banks go to the repo market or the Fed window is still a function of the demand for cash.
Again, I have fairly limited knowledge of the FTPL…and you may know more. So I’ll just restate my argument in terms that I (being ignorant), believe:
1. The monetary authority can always reign in inflation, even in the face of an expansionary (Ricardian) fiscal policy. For example, the 80′s.
2. Fiscal policy can drive inflation only insofar as it is accompanied by an expansive monetary policy, or if there is a strong expectation of such a policy in the future. For example, the failure of fiscal policy in Japan.
3. Expansive fiscal policy can always be neutralized by by an unwilling monetary authority. In this model, of course, the monetary authority “picks” a price level, and as long as it is unconstrained (legally?) by an interest rate target, can always sterilize purchases of nominal debt. For example, the ECB.
4. Any non-Ricardian expansion of fiscal policy needs to be resolved for all unobservable prices for a given (endogenous) M * V.
Wednesday ~ June 23rd, 2010 at 3:51 am
John Cochrane’s View of the Recession
[...] this post was inspired by another post called “Is John Cochrane Sumnerian Now?“ I vaguely recall that he had a more finance-oriented view of the recession when we debated [...]