Comments on: How should we weigh the desires of the non-existent?

By: Attorney Don Hecker Specification » Efficient Isn’t Moral

Attorney Don Hecker Specification » Efficient Isn’t Moral — Thu, 18 Mar 2010 15:53:10 +0000

[...] Adam Ozimek responded: [...]

By: Adam Ozimek

Adam Ozimek — Mon, 15 Mar 2010 22:40:39 +0000

Peter, that’s a really really good point about the selfishness of satisfying ancestors wishes. You’ve really gotten at the problem though: I don’t think we quite know how to weigh the welfare of future generations, so I can see why when pondering intertemporal utility and welfare we’d perhaps temporarily consider satisfying the wishes of our ancestors. You’re right though, in the end worrying about the future and the present is the only real concern.

By: The Dead Don’t Want « Modeled Behavior

The Dead Don’t Want « Modeled Behavior — Mon, 15 Mar 2010 22:28:26 +0000

[...] we should count satisfying the preferences of the dead as a benefit in cost benefit analysis. I disagreed, arguing 1) that it would lead to horrible outcomes, and 2) the dead don’t know whether [...]

By: Overcoming Bias : Efficient Isn’t Moral

Overcoming Bias : Efficient Isn’t Moral — Mon, 15 Mar 2010 16:01:43 +0000

[...] Adam Ozimek responded: [...]

By: Peter Belenky

Peter Belenky — Mon, 15 Mar 2010 13:58:17 +0000

This discussion raises a painfully timely question. If we can increase our enjoyment by destroying all possibility of future life on earth, in what way would that be inefficient? In truth, respect for the wishes of ancestors, like concern for the welfare of future generations, involves only satisfaction of the preferences of the living. The first, however, is egotistical, failure hurting only ourselves, while the latter involves generosity, empathy, and self-sacrifice. We might call this more ethical by some standard. In any case, it is necessary to consider the value and feasibility of respecting individual preferences, modifying them more or less authoritatively, or overriding them by force.