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	<title>Comments on: The Definition of &#8220;Is&#8221;</title>
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		<title>By: Living Forever in a Computer &#171; Rortybomb</title>
		<link>http://modeledbehavior.com/2009/11/30/the-definition-of-is/#comment-801</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Living Forever in a Computer &#171; Rortybomb]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 01 Dec 2009 13:57:48 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description><![CDATA[[...] Karl and Adam at Modeled Behavior respond, and so does Julian Sanchez: Suppose that via some kind of Star Trek replication or some combination of cloning, highly advanced brain scanning, and neuron-etching nanotech, scientists create a precise physical duplicate of you. Just as your duplicate is waking up—so let’s be clear, there are now two extremely similar but clearly distinct loci of conscious experience in the room—you’re told (ever so sorry) that as an unfortunate side-effect of the process, your original body (you’re assured you are the original) is about to die. Should you be alarmed, or should you consider your copy’s survival, in effect, a means by which you survive? [...]]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] Karl and Adam at Modeled Behavior respond, and so does Julian Sanchez: Suppose that via some kind of Star Trek replication or some combination of cloning, highly advanced brain scanning, and neuron-etching nanotech, scientists create a precise physical duplicate of you. Just as your duplicate is waking up—so let’s be clear, there are now two extremely similar but clearly distinct loci of conscious experience in the room—you’re told (ever so sorry) that as an unfortunate side-effect of the process, your original body (you’re assured you are the original) is about to die. Should you be alarmed, or should you consider your copy’s survival, in effect, a means by which you survive? [...]</p>
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